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THE NEED, THE PROPRIETY AND BASIS OF
MARTIAL LAW, WITH A REVIEW OF

THE AUTHORITIES'
GEORGE S. WALLACE 2

THE NEED
The experience of individual man has been and will continue to
be that occasions will arise in his life when a defense of his person
and property by force is an absolute necessity. Communities of men
have had, and will continue to have, the same experience. The ideal
of governinent expressed by the great lawyer, David Dudley Field,
is only an ideal, the attainment of which now seems farther off than
ever before. 'It is as follows:
"A self-balanced and self-governed state, where every man stands erect in
the fulness of his rights and the pride of his manhood, neither cringing nor
overbearing, owing no allegiance but to duty, claiming none but from the

heart, filling every service and exercising every right of the citizen; a government founded, not on the traditions of remote ages, not on usurpation, not on
conquest, but on things firmer and older than all-the equality and brotherhood
of man."
The men who framed and adopted our present constitution recognized that while it was essential that the war-making power should
be in the general government, that the several states would from
time to time face conditions that would make it absolutely necessary
to defend themselves, and by a constitutional provision reserved to
the several states the right of self-defense.3
The exercise of this right against organized rebellion, or a foreign
state, is war. An incident to the exercise of this right by a state
within its own territory in case of war or insurrection is the right to
declare and apply martial law as a domestic fact.4
Martial law has been declared and exercised in six states in the
past three years, 5 and as a result there has been a great deal of
discussion in the press about the extent to which it has been used.
Some writers and public men have questioned the necessity of the
measures used under it, and others have taken the broader ground
that martial law as a domestic fact cannot exist in the United States,
'Read before the American Society of Military Law, at its annual meeting in Chicago, September, 1916.
2
Late Lieutenant-Colonel 2nd Infantry, W. Va. National Guard, and now
Major J. A. G., 0. R. C., U. S. Army. Member of W. Va. Bar, Huntington,
W. Va.
3
Art. 1, Sec. 10, Par. 3, U. S. Constitution.
4
Hallecks International Law, Vol. 1, page 508.
GWest Virginia, Colorado, Ohio, Montana, Galveston, Texas, and Atlanta,

Georgia.
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under the Constitution of the United States, or of any of the several
states-confending that the military forces of either national or state
government can only be used in the aid of and not independent of the
civil authority, citing as authority for this position the case of Elva v.
Smith, Mass. 5 Gray, and Frank v. Smith, Ky. 53 L. R. A., (N. S.)
1141.
The first case was one in which the military was called out- for
the express purpose of assisting the marshal, who was attempting to
execute a process under the fugitive slave law, and the question of
the right to declare or enforce martial law was not considered, and
does not support this contention.
In Frank v. Smith (supra) 6 disturbances brought about by persons banded together under the name of "'Night Riders" were not
suppressed by the local authorities, and the Governor ordered out the
militia. There was no proclamation of martial law, or declaration of
a state of war. The commander of the military forces directed that
persons traveling through the country after night should be investigated, and if found suspicious to be arrested and held for the 'civil
authorities. The plaintiff, traveling with a number of other persons
along the road just about midnight, had a pistol in the buggy in which
he was riding. He was arrested by .the defendant under the belief
that he was guilty of carrying concealed weapons, detained until the
morning following, turned over to the civil authorities, and then released. He afterwa -ds brought suit for damages, recovered a verdict
before a jury, and the case went to the Supreme Court of Kentucky,
who affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
The case turned upon the constitutional provision that the military shall at all times be in strict subordination to the civil power,
and while it tends to sustain this theory, it must also be borne in mind
that the court, in its opinion, stated:
"Of course we have not in mind a state of case in which actual war * * *
exists, as it would be entirely beyond the scope of the questions we are considering to venture an opinion, much less lay down any rule of action for the
government of military forces operating in the territory where a state of war
actually prevailed."
This admission in the face of the 'constitutional provisions is an
admission that conditions could exist that would make it necessary
for the executive ta exercise power in the discharge of his constitutional- duties greater than those permitted by. this decision.. The de6
Approved and followed in Fluke et al v. Canton-Adjutant Gen. Oak.,
123 Pac. 1049. Contempt proceedings against Adjut. Gen. acting under Governor's orders in controversy over re-location of county seat
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cision, as a whole,- is in conflict with the weight of authority, and will
not bear analysis, the court holding that the constitution makes the
Governor commander-in-chief of the militia, charges him with the
duty of seeing that the laws are faithfully executed, and that this
power cannot be controlled by the courts, as it is a power belonging to
a co-ordinate branch of the government, and the constitution forbids
one department to exercise any powers of either of the other; that
the request of the civil authorities is not necessary to enable the Governor to call out the militia under a statute making it his duty to do
so when he may deem it necessary for the safety of the commonwealth, or, in 'the case of invasion, insurrection, domestic violence,
etc.; that the Governor, in the exercise of this constitutional and
statutory power, acts as a civil and not as a military officer, and must
direct its movements and operations in accordance with law, when
the constitution provides that the military shall at all times be in
strict subordination to the civil power-that a member of the militia
thus called out is not justified in obeying the order of his superior
officer to make an arrest that would be in excess of the powers which
might be exercised -by a peace officer of the state.
In effect, it holds that the Governor, as a co-ordinate branch of
the government, is charged under the constitution with certain duties
and invested with powers to perform those duties; yet, in the method
of performance, the Court, and not the Governor, decides how these
duties are to be performed. This is in conflict with the decided cases. 7
In the course of its opinion the court stated:
"In ordering out and controlling the movements of the state militia the
Governor is answerable only at the bar of public opinion, unless it be that
abuses might warrant impeachment proceedings, it cannot for a moment be
entertained that the governor must delay action until requested by the local
authorities. This limitation upon his constitutional duty would, in many instances, deny him the right to take prompt and decisive action and suppress
threatened or actual disorders or violence, and enforce obedience to the law%;.
It would interfere with the express authority conferred upon him by the
statute, and would in many instances and many places be disastrous to the
peace and welfare of the state. Primarily the enforcement of the law is with
the local civil authorities, but at times they are too weak to control the lawless
element that exists in every society, and at other times they might be in sympathy with the forces who want to take the law into their own hands; but whatever the reason what may exist for the failure or inability of the local civil
authorities to suppress violence and disorder, when it comes to pass that they
cannot or will not do it, then it is not only the right, but the plain duty of the
governor to .act."
7
AMartin %,.Molt, 12 Wheaton 19. Prize Cases, 2 Black, 636. McCullough v.
Moreland, 4 Wheaton 314.
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In the case at bar the civil authorities had not acted, and the
Governor, acting under express power, was attempting to control a
lawless element. His action in this connection -was a political act,
or the action of a co-ordinate branch of the government.
The court concludei:
"We have reached the conclusion that any military order, whether it be
given by the governor of a state or the officer of the militia, or the civil officer
of the city or county, that attempts to invest either officers or privates with
authority in excess of that which may be exercised by a peace officer of the
state, is unreasonable and unlawful."
Apply this doctrine to the action of the President in Colorado
in issuing his proclamations of May 1st and May 6th, 1914, and
under which proclamation officers and men of the United States army
disarmed persons residing within the proclaimed districts. Every
officer or soldier who disarmed such citizen, unless there was an express statute authorizing such action, was liable in an actiof of trespass to the person so injured. It is true that the court, in its opinion,
leaves a loop-hole to meet such a situation: "of course, we have not
in mind a state of case in which actual war exists." But would it
hold that the civil disorder in Colorado was a state of war, and the
actions under the proclamation authorized, or would it accept as final
the declaration of the political departments of the government that a
state of war existed? This, of course, is not a practical question so
far as the Federal authorities were concerned, as doubtless the Federal
courts would follow the doctrine laid down in the case of Moyer v.
Peabody.
The court, in holding that the order was without lawftil authority
and did not protect a subordinate officer, is in conflict with a recognized rule that a subordinate is required to obey and is not excused in
obeying an order from his superior, "unless the act was manifestly
beyond the scope of his authority, or was such that a man of ordinary
sense and understanding would know that it was illegal, that it would
be a protection to him if he acted in good faith and without malice."'
These cases, therefore, will not sustain the contention that the
military can only be used in aid of civil authority, and not independent
thereof.
The contentibn that the military can only be used in aid of civil
authority assumes that there is always a civil authority in the disturbed districts to be supported, and loses sight of a condition that
8U.S. v. Clark, 31 Fed. 711. McCall v. McDowell, Fed. Cases, 8673. Riggs
v. State (Tenn.), 91 Am. Dec. 272. State ex rel Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206
Pa. 65 L. R. A. 193.
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frequently exists, and which has to be dealt with, e. g.: In Idaho,
after some six or seven years experience, seeing that the execution
of the laws in Shoshone County, through the ordinary and established
means and methods, was practically impossible, the Governor proclaimed martial law and with the aid of Federal troops restored order.
In Colorado, in 1913 and 1914, no attention was paid to thr
courts or the civil peace officers whatever, and there was a case of
repression of the civil law.
Still another condition is frequent where the disorder is of such
proportions that practically every man, woman and child is a partisan
on one side or the other, with the remainder of the populatiot afraid
to take any stand for fear of personal violence from one of the other
factions, the local magistrates and constables active partisans, and as
was said by one magistrate in such a district, that he was at home and
was within one hundred and fifty yards from the scene when a battle
took place between contending factions, which lasted about thirty
minutes, and in which battle perhaps one thousand shots were fired,
"that he knew nothing about it, heard nothing about it, that he had
lived at his present home twenty years, and had never seen a hostile
blow struck."
With clashes between contending factions frequent and violent,
lives being lost, persons assaulted, property destroyed, the county and
local officers affording no protection to person, or property, but declaring their inability to cope with the situation, and that they had and
could get no evidence against the law-breaker, to ask if the state
must depend upon or look alone to local authorities under these conditions, and has no power within itself to take hold of the situation
and protedt life and property, admits of but one answer.
To contend that the force used to restore order is only to be
used in aid of an authority that has made no effort to maintain law
and order, and in some cases is partisan enough not to want law and
order, is to make an effort doomed in advance to failure, and, as was
said by the United States Supreme Court:
"If the inhabitants of the state, or a great body of them, should combine
to obstruct interstate commerce or the transportation of mails, prosecution
f6r such offences had in such a community would be doomed in advance to
failure, and if the certainty of such failure was known, and the national government had no other way to enforce freedom of interstate commerce and the
transportation of mails than by the prosecution and punishment for interference
OStatement of operations of the court submitted by Gov. Ammons to
M. D. Foster, Chairman of Mines and Mine Committee, Washington, D. C.
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therewith, the whole interest of the nation, in this respect, would be at the
mercy of a portion of the inhabitants of that single state.'O

At the time of writing this article the Mexican situation is acute,
and the newspapers are carrying reports of serious disturbances in
certain border counties of Texas. The Secretary of State is quoted
as saying that the internal disturbance in Texas is a problem for the

state government.
Conceive of a county made up of partisans who are strong enough
to dominate and do dominate the county officers and who would fail
to enforce the law, would the State of Texas sit by and take no steps
to suppress local disorders, other than to .send into such county its
military force and make arrests, and then turn the persons so arrested
over to their friends to be promptly released to make further trouble?
When the Governor of Colorado called upon the President in
1914 for Federal troops to maintain law and order in his state, the
President, in one of his communications to the Governor, expressed
his surprise that "a state should surrender its sovereignty so willingly."
It is clear that a state needs this power, and Article 1, Section
10, Cl. 3, of the Constitution of the United States; viz:
"No state shall engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
danger as will not admit of delay,"

does not take away from the state its war-making power, but, upon
the contrary, recognizes that the states originally possessed it, and in
adopting the Constitution did not surrender it entirely, but limited its
use to actual necessity. This view was taken by the Supreme Court
of the United States.11
This need of the state is not new. It does not grow out of modern conditions, and it is believed that this power 2has not been taken
away or limited by the Fourteenth Amendment.'
THE PROPRIETY

The need for martial law, whether it is founded on necessity, or
is an incident of the war-making power inherent in a sovereign state,
we believe must be conceded. -Its propriety, meaning thereby its
being put into effect, is a political question which must be decided by
the proper department of the state or nation, usually the executive.
The executive who makes this decision is in the same position as the
man who is called upon to exercise his right of self-defense-who
decides a question fraught with great moment to himself. The man
0
1n re Debs, 158 U. S. 534.
"Luther v. Bordenr, 7 Howard 1.
1-Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 79.

MARTIAL LAW

who strikes in self-defense answers before -a jury, who judges his act
from the circumstances as they appeared to him when he acted; the
executive who declares martial law is liable to impeachment if he acts
improperly, 3 and, in all events, when quiet is restored, he is tried at
the bar of public opinion. A large part of such opinion, for the time
being, is based on reports that have no foundation in fact, and upon
criticisms made by persons "who think in vote"' and have not been
careful to inform themselves as to all the facts. Disagreeable as this
is, it serves a good purpose, as no executive will, except as a last
resort, adopt martial law measures, for the obvious reason that, right
or wrong, his action will subject him to much adverse criticism.
The propriety of martial law being a political question, the measures and steps to enforce it rest also with this branch of the government. Under our system of government, i. e., with the three coordinate branches, it seems anomalous to say that the executive department of a state government has the power of detention in time of insuriection or riot, and that the persons detained who petition the court
for a release upon habeas corpus and are "remanded to the military
authorities, have leave to repetition after thirty days, if at that time
4
they have not been delivered to the civil authorities."'
This holding would seem to take from the executive the power
to decide the necessity of detention, and at the end of thirty days,
upon re-petition, put upon the executive the burden of showing to the
court that the necessity continued to exist. Yet how would this proof
be made, and would it admit of a traverse? If so, this does away with
a co-ordinate branch of the government, and substitutes a judicial
discretion in place of the executive discretion, and would seem to be
in conflict with the decided cases."0
THE BASIS
Chief Justice Chase, in the Milligan case, 4 Wallace, page 142,
in discussing military jurisdiction, held:
"That there are, under the Constitution, three kinds of military jurisdiction:
1. ****.

2. ****
3. While the third may be denominated martial law proper, and is called
into action by Congress, or temporarily when the action of Congress cannot be
invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril by the President in
time of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts or
13Frank v. Smith,

53 L. R. A., N. S. 1154.
'4EX parte McDonald, Montana 143, Pacific 947.
"gMartin v. Molt, 12 Wheaton 19, 2 Black 636. Ex parte Moore, 64 N. C.
87. In re Moyer, 36 Col. 160. In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609.
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localities where ordinary law no longer adequately secures public safety and
private rights."
This power has beeri designated as martial law at home, or as a
domestic fact, and is the subject dealt with in this paper.
Chief Justice Chase finds the basis for the exercise of this power
by the general government under the constitutional powers to raise
and support armies and to declare war, and Mr. Justice Swain, who
wrote the majority opinion, holds that the occasions when it can b6
properly applied are limited to actual necessity.
The adoption of the Constitution of 1787 by the several states
created a government sovereign in its sphere, and while its powers
were enumerated, it must of necessity have what it has since asserted;
the inherent power in itself to preserve itself, and to carry out the
powers granted. The states, in adopting the Constitution, did not
divest themselves of their sovereignty, or limit their powers, except as
expressly set out therein. It is true that the trend of things now is to
look to an increase of the power of the national government, and to
limit the powers of the state; but with this fact this article has nothing to do. We disagree with the theory that has been urged that the
states, as such, have no power to declare martial law as a domestic
fact, and believe the authorities show that it is as necessary for a state
as for the United States, and the 'exercise of this power finds its
justification, in both cases, in the same source.
Different writers, in discussing the Luther v. Borden case, have
attempted to raise a doubt as to what the court meant when it held
"that the right to declare and apply and exercise martial law is one
of the rights of sovereignty;" that martial law is an indefinite term
and that the Court probably did not mean what it held. Although
there has been confusion in the use of this term by certain writers
and in some instances by courts, for a great number of years prior to
the decision in this case, the subject had 'received the attention of
courts and text writers, and its definition fixed:
"Martial law is the law that depends upon the just and arbitrary power
of the King or his lieutenant in time of war; for, in war, by reason of the

great danger arising upon small occasions, he useth absolute power.16
"Martial law is an arbitrary law originated in emergencies, regulated by
the expediency
of the moment, and extending to all the inhabitants of a place
7
1

or country."
"Martial law is a temporary government controlled by "military authority

'0 Quotation from Smith Rep. Aug. Lib. II, 03, cited in Blunt's Law Dictionary and Cowell Edition 1670.
17Dr. Wooster's Dictionary.

MARTIAL LAW

175

of territory in which, by reason of war or public disturbance, the civil government is inadequate to the preservation of order and enforcement of law."18

So it is safe to assume that the court, at the time of deciding the
Luther v. Borden case, understood the term "martial law" in the same
sense in which it is understood at this time.
The exercise of this power has been, and we venture to suggest
will be, the basis of much contention between those entrusted with the
power and responsibility of government in troublesome times, and
publicists and text writers, with the result that it will continue to be
used, from time to time, when the occasion arises, it matters not from
what source it is derived or how it is justified.
English lawyers and publicists are divided upon the question
of martial law as a domestic fact, one group insisting that martial law
as a domestic fact has no place in England since the Petition of Rights,
and urge in support of this theory that Lord Mansfield, in his speech
in Parliament at the time of the Lord George Gordon riots stated
that there was no martial law, but that the military was acting within
its common law powers. This same line of reasoning is followed by
Sir Frederick Pollock, who submits:
"So-called martial law as distinct from military law is an unlucky name
for the justification by the common law of acts done by necessity for the defense of the commonwealth, when there is war within the realm. Such acts
are not necessarily acts of personal force or restraint. They may be preventive as well as punitive"
And he concludes:
"First, that there may be purely a common law justification for acts being
otherwise trespasses, done in time of war within the realm, on the ground of
public defense.
Second, the person justifying such act must show that he acted in good
faith.

Third, there must be a reasonable and probable cause, according to the
apparent urgency.
The justification of any particular act done in a state of war is ultimately
examinable in the ordinary court." 1o
This reasoning would seem to lead to the same result as martial
law as a domestic fact, with the exception that the necessity for its
exercise is ultimately a question for the courts, and not a political
question.
The other school of lawyers and publicists contend that the Petition of Rights declared the exercise of martial law in time of peace
unlawful; that when the courts-are closed and the civil authorities
1840 Cyc. 787.

IOXVIII Law Quarterly Review, 152.
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are unable to maintain law and order, the Crown has the power to
declare a state of war to exist. In support of this position the Wolf
Tone case, relied upon by the first school of lawyers, is shown to be a
case arising, not in time of war, but in a place remote from the scene
of hostilities, and after the rebellion was over, and that the conviction, under either theory, was clearly illegal;. that Governor Wall's
case did not arise under a place or time of war, but under the statute
relating to the discipline of the army, and he was convicted upon the
issue whether he had acted in good faith under the belief of a mutiny
or on mere pretext and malice; that the legality of martial- law has
been recognized by acts of Parliament in 1798; that at the time of
the Lord George Gordon riots:
"The privy council was convened, at which not cabinet ministers alone,
but all who had a seat, were desired to attend. The King himself was present.
Irresolution still prevailed; nor was anything decisive or effectual suggested.
The counsel had risen when the King anxiously demanded if no measures
could be recommended. The Attorney General answered that he knew but of
one-that of declaring the assembly rebellious, and authorizing the military to
act when necessity required, although the magistrates should not attend. The
King desired him to make up the order, which he did at the table on one
knee, and a proclamation was drawn up, and orders from the Adjutant Gen20
eral's office issued accordingly."

The military, under this act or proclamation, commenced to put
a stop to outrages, and in doing so killed something like four hundred
people. The day following the House of Commons declined to proceed

to business, under the notion that London was subjected to martial
law.
During the present German-English war, under date of November
27, 1914 the following article appeared in the newspapers:
"London, Nov. 27.-Viscount Haldane, Lord Chancellor, gave assurance
during the session that between now and the reassembling of Parliament, no
British civilian tried by court martial would be deprived of life. The'subject
was raised by Earl Loreburn, who moved and amendment to the Defense of
the Realm Bill, to provide that a British civilian, charged under the act,
should have the -right to demand trial by the ordinary civil court. Viscount
Haldane pointed out that the amendment would kill the bill, and Earl Loreburn
withdrew it upon the above assurance being given him."

From this action it would seem that the House of Lords does not
regard martial law as a domestic fact as having been abolished in
England, although its use has not been necessary for many -years.
Both schools of thought seem to be agreed upon one point: whether
2OAdolph's History of England, Vol. 3, pp. 246-54.
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martial law exists as a domestic fact, or whether it is exercised under
the common law right, the power finds its justification in necessity.
In the recent decision of the case In re Marius, decided in 1902,
the Privy Council considered a case arising under martial law in
South Africa, and adopted the views contended for by the minority
opinion in the case Ex Parte Milligan, i. e.:
"That the area now affected by war, the area over which martial law is a
necessity, and because of that necessity lawful or excusable, is much larger
and much more extended than was the case prior to the increased facilities
afforded for locomotion by railways and other improved modes of travel, and
prior to the improved modes of transmitting information and orders by telegraph and light."
This case distinctly puts an end to the ancient rule that because
for some purposes the courts are open at a place, that place must be
held to be where peace exists, no matter what the actual facts may
be.
THE UNITED STATES.

Martial law had been invoked in the Colonies prior to the Revolution. Sir Thomas Dale used it at Jamestown in the beginning of that
colony; Sir William Berkeley after Bacon's Rebellion; General Gage
declared martial law at Boston in 1775, and Lord Dunmore in Virginia at the same time;21 General Washington at Valley Forge in
1776; Lord Cornwallis in Georgia and the Carolinas in 1780. The
State of Virginia, by an Act of the General Assembly passed May,
1780, declared that martial law should be in effect within ten miles
from the lines of its armies, and provided for the trial of civilians,
and also provided that in case of any insurrection within that commonwealth, or if the same should be invaded by the enemy, "that person
or persons within the same; who act as guides, spies, or who shall
furnish the enemy with provisions or necessaries," and certain other
offenses, should be tried by court martial ;22 and this in the face of
the fact that it had a constitution that contained a guarantee of a
jury trial by a jury from the vicinage. These acts were enforced
in the State of Virginia in 1780 and 1781, as will appear from the
trials of certain civilians by courts martial found in the manuscript
of State Papers in the State Library at Richmond.
The Confederate States exercised and enforced martial law
throughout the Confederacy, and particularly within the City of
23
Richmond.
2110 Hen. Statutes at Large, pages 311, et seq.

22
Richardson's Documents and Papers of the Confederacy.
-23Burk's History of Virginia, 4th Volume.
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It may be contended that these facts are not authority under our
present constitution, and while that may be conceded, they certainly go
to show that men who are acquainted with the English law and constitutions recognize that martial law was a part of the system to be
appealed to when necessary. The Massachusetts Legislature declared
martial law at the time of Shay's Rebellion. Its present constitution
provides that martial law can only be declared by its Legislature.
Martial law was declared by General Jacksoh at New Orleans in
1815. This declaration was considered in the case of Johnson v.
Duncan, 6 Am. Dec., 675, and 3 Martin. In this case a motion that
the court might proceed with the hearing of the case at bar was
resisted, and one of the grounds of such position was:
"That the City (New Orleans) and its environs were by general orders
of the officer commanding the military district 'put on the 15th of December
last under strict martial law."

The court held:
"The power of the President, under the Constitution, to call out the military
forces of any part of the Union, in case of invasion, may be exercised by his
delegate, as commanding officer, in a particular district, and all citizens subject
to military rule at that time may be thereby placed under military law; but
this is the extent of martial law, and all beyond it is usurpation."

In the course of its-opinion the court stated:
"It is therefore our opinion that the authority of the courts of justice has
not been suspended of right, by the proclamation of martial law, nor by the
declaration of the General of the Seventh Military District that the City of
New Orleans was a camp, and we now repeat what we declared when the
subject was discussed, 'that the powers vested in us by law can be suspended by
none but legislative authority.'"

"Compare the views therein expressed with the letter from Chief
Justice Chase, of the Supreme Court of the United States, addressed
to the President of the United States, under date of Washington,
October 12, 1865:
"I so much doubt the propriety of holding Circuit Courts of the United

States in states which have been declared by the executive and legislative
department of the national government to be in rebellion, and therefore subjected to martial law-before the complete restoration of their broken relations

with the nation and the supercedure of military by civil administration-that
I am unwilling to hold such courts in such states within my circuit, which
includes Virginia, until Congress shall have had an opportunity to consider and

act on the whole subject. A civil court in a district under, martial law can
only act by the -sanction and under the suspension of the-military power, but
I cannot think it becomes Justices of the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction under such condition. In this view, it is proper to say that Mr. Justice
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concurs with me. I have had
Wayne, whose whole circuit is in the rebel states,
24
no opportunity to confer with other justices."
The Rhode Island Legislature declared martial law at the time of
Dorr's Rebellion, and as the result of it the case of Luther v. Borden,
7 Howard, was decided by the Supreme Court with a dissenting
opinion by Judge Woodbury. The majority opinion held:
"The right to declare and apply and exercise martial law is one of the
rights of sovereignty, and is as essential to the existence of the state as the
right to declare or carry on war. * * * The power is essential to the existence
of every government, essential to the preservation of order and every institution, and is as necessary to the states of' this Union as to any other government The state itself must determine what degree of force the crisis
demands."
Justice Woodbury dissented, and discussed at great length the
constitutional guaranties and rights of the individual, but at page 83
of his opinion admits the right to declare martial law in the theatre
of actual war, or of civil disorder, holding:
"But in civil strife they are not to extend beyond the place where insurrection exists, nor to the portion of the state remote from the scene of military
operations."
In 1856 the Territorial Governor of Washington Territory declared martial law, and the question of his .authority to do so was
submitted to Mr. Cushing, then the Attorney General of the United
States, who arrived at the conclusion that the Territorial Governor
did not have this power. In 1885 and 1886, in the -same territory,
in an illegal uprising against the Chinese, which resulted in riot and
disorder, the then Territorial Governor declared an insurrection to
exist, and placed the territory under martial law. The President of
the United States approved the Governor's action, and issued a proclamation stating that the case which has arisen justified, and required
under the Constitution of the laws of the United States, the employment of military force to suppress violence and enforce the faithful
execution of the laws, and sent Federal troops into the territory for
this purpose.
When the Civil War was commenced in 1861, the real test of the
stability of this government came. Could the government sustain
itself, and did it have, under the Constitution, the power to exercise
belligerent rights against those who were in truth and fact citizens
of the United States? In the Prize Cases, 2 Black, the right of the
government to blockade, the Confederate states was challenged, and
24
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the rights to seize and capture as prizes of war goods belonging to
persons within the limits of the Confederate states were denied by
four judges. The majority held that war actually existed and the
sovereign may exercise both belligerent and sovereign rights.
It must be borne in mind that in times like those judges were
human, and in many instances saw the cases from the standpoint
of party politics, and that while many of the acts of the officers of
the general government in the conflict of the war, when brought
before the court, were not sustained, it will be shown that in every
case in every court the right to declare and enforce martial law,
under some circumstances, was recogniz-ed. The cases follow:
In re Kemp, 16 Wisconsin, 383, held:
"The power- suspending the writ of habeas corpus under the first section
of Article 9 of the Constitution, 'isa legislative power; and is vested in

Congress, and the President had no power to suspend the writ,"
but held:
"Martial law is restricted to and can only exist in those places which are
the actual theatre of war and their immediate vicinity and it cannot be extended
to remote districts. * * * But if, owing to the disloyalty of the magistrates,
or the insurrectional spirit of the people the laws cannot be enforced or
-maintained, then martial law takes the place of civil law in such district whenever there is sufficient military force to execute it."

Jones v. Seward, 40 Barber, N. Y., 63, a case arising out of the
arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff by order of Mr. Seward.
It is a terrific arraignment of the exercise of arbitrary power, but
admits that the Commander-in-Chief may exercise the right of martial
law within the theatre of .military operations.
Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. An action of trespass brought by Johnson and others against Jones for an arrest made of the plaintiff by
the defendant in the State of Illinois, and the plaintiff was taken-by
force to New York and there imprisoned for a time and afterwards
taken to the State of Delaware and there imprisoned at Fort Delaware.
The defendants justified their action under a plea that they were
United States Marshals and that the plaintiff was engaged in aiding
a society in treasonable purposes. The court held: .
"The President had no rightful power, in the time of peace, to cause an
arrest- of a citizen of one state, without process and convey him to* another
state and there imprison him without judicial writ or warrant in a military
fortress."
"Martial law is not law, in any proper sense, but merely the will of the
military commander, to be exercised by him only on his responsibility to his
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government or superior officer, and when once established it applies alike to
citizen and soldier."
"Martial law must be permitted to prevail on the actual theatre of military
operations in time of war, is an unavoidable necessity resulting from the
very nature of war."
"The commanding officer may arrest persons, whether citizen or alien,
under authority of martial law, whom he finds within his lines giving aid or
information to the enemy, and detain him so long as may be necessary for the
security or success of his army."
"The government may be justified in treating a district as virtually attached
to the theatre of military operations, and in enforcing martial law therein
so far as may be necessary to the public safety, if in a district remote from
the theatre of military operations the popular sentiment is so disloyal to the
government that one who aids and abets the public enemy cannot be rendered
powerless, and brought to justice by the arm of the civil law. Exercise of
martial law can be defended upon no ground beyond its enforcement on the
actual field of military operations, which is the result of an overmastering
necessity, and its establishment in districts which, though removed from the
seat of war, are yet so far in sympathy with the public enemy as to obstruct
the administration of laws through the civil tribunals, and rendering a resort
to military power a necessity, as the only means of restraining disloyalty from
overt acts and preserving the authority of the government. War does not, of
itself, suspend at once and everywhere, the constitutional guaranties of liberty
and property. Martial law cannot be resorted to in that part of the clountry
where the civil courts, in the midst of loyal communities, are exercising their
ordinary jurisdiction, although the government may be prosecuting a war for
the suppression-of rebellion in other parts of the country. Persons arrested in
such loyal community and deprived of his liberty by order of the President
* * * with'out legal process, for alleged disloyal practices therein, such arrest
will be unlawful."

Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Indiana, 1863, a case in which a provost
marshal arrested a man not in any way connected with the army,
for retailing liquor in his usual place of business to soldiers. The
court held the defendant liable to the arrested party for damages, but
held:
"The President had a right to govern through his military officers by martial law, when and where the civil power is suspended, by force. In all other
times and places the civil excludes the martial law, and that it is a right
exercised precisely upon the point on which self-defense justified the use of
force by individuals."

In the matter of Martin, 45 Barber, 143, Supreme Court of New
York, Leonard, Judge, held:
"When necessity arises, the military power is paramount,
and the laws are
silent."

McLaughlin v. Graham, 50 Miss., decided in 1874, held the com-
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manding officer liable for the destruction of certain liquors, and held,
in finding that martial law may rightfully obtain:
"It is limited to the theatre of actual military operations, when no civil
authority remains and there is a necessity to furnish a substitute to preserve
the safety of the army and society, and martial rule shall only prevail until
the laws can have their free course."
In re Vallandigham, Circuit Court of the United States, Southern
District of Ohio.
In 1863, Mr. Vallandigham, a resident of the State of Ohio and
a citizen of the United States, was arrested in that state under the
order of the military commander thereof, taken to Cincinnati and
arraigned before a military commission on a charge of having expressed sympathies for those in arms against the government of the
United States, and for having uttered in a speech in a public meeting
disloyal sentiments, opinion, etc., With the object and purpose of
weakening the powers of the government in its efforts for the suppression of an unlawful rebellion. The President, in commutation of
the sentence, directed the commander to send the prisoner, without
delay, to the headquarters of General Rosecrani, to be by him put
beyond the military lines, which order was executed.
The Court held:
"The commander of a military department, as the agent and representative
of the President, in time of civil war, has authority, under the Constitutional
provisioris making the President the commander-in-chief, even in a locality where
martial law is not in force, to arrest citizens not in the military or naval
service, for mischievous acts of disloyalty which impede or endanger the
military operations of the government. Such arrests are justifiable on the
ground of military necessity, and of the existence of that necessity 'the commanding general is the exclusive judge, and the courts have no authority, by
writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into it."

Vallandigham petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States
for a writ of certiorari, to the Judge Advocate General of the'United
States. The court declined the writ on the ground that a military commission is not a court within the meaning of the Judiciary Act, and
that there was no jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to issue a writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum to review or reverse, or the writ of
5
certiorari to revise the proceedings of a military commission.2
The Court, in the course of its decision, used the following language:
"As -to the President's actions in such matter, and those acting in them
251 Wallace 243.
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under his authority, Ave refer to the opinions expressed by this court in the
case of Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat., 29, and Dynes v. Hoover, 20 Howard, 65."
The last point in the syllabus of the latter case:
"If a court martial has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
charge it has been convened to try, or shall inflict punishment forbidden by the
law, though its sentence be approved by the officers having revisory power over
it, civil courts may, in an action by a party aggrieved by it, inquire into the
want of the court's jurisdiction, and give redress."
Did the court mean to intimate that it disagreed with the holding
of the Circuit Court, and that Vallandigham would have been entitled
to recover from the defendants in an action of trespass for false

imprisonment?
In re Eagan, Federal case 44303, a man tried by a military commission in the State of South Carolina, petitioner was discharged
upon a habeas corpus, upon the ground that the commission was without jurisdiction, on account of the re-establishment of the civil courts
before the commission of the offense and the trial. The court held:
"Martial law is the will of the general who commands the army. It can be
indulged in only in cases of necessity, and ceases when necessity ends."
Ex parte Milligan, decided in 1866, involved the trial and conviction by a military commission of Milligan, who was arrested in
the State of Indiana, in which there was no war and had not been,
and in which the courts were not only sitting, but absolutely unobstructed in the exercise of their powers. The majority held:
"It will be borne in mind that this is not a question of the power to
proclaim martial law when war exists in a community and the courts and civil
authorities are overthrown. * * * * Martial law cannot arise from a threatened
invasion. The necessity must be actual and present, -the invasion real, such
as will effectually close the courts and dispose of civil administration. * * *
It follows from what has been said on this subject that there are occasions
when martial rule can be properly applied. If in foreign invasions or civil
war the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal
justice according to law, then in the theatre of actual military operations where
war really prevails there is a necessity for substitute for civil authority thus
overthrown."

The minority held:.
"Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail. What we do
maintain is, that when the hation is involved in war, and some portions of the
country are invaded, and all are exposed to invasion, it is within the power
of Congress to determine to what State or districts such great and imminent
public danger exists as justifies the authorization of military tribunals for
the trial of crimes and offenses against the discipline or security of the army
or against the public safety."
It.will be seen that this case does not decide that martial law
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as a domestic fact cannot exist in the United States, but clearly recognizes the right of martial law under the conditions set forth in the
opinion. James A. Garfield, of counsel for the petitioner, made the
same distinction.
In North Carolina, by reason of certain disorders brought about
by the activities of persons known as the Ku Klux Klan, the Governor of North Carolina declared the counties of Alamance and Caswell to be in a state of insurrection. His action came before the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in application for a habeas corpus
in the cases of Ex parte Moore and Ex parte Kerr, found in 64 N. C.
807-816. The Court held:
"The constitution and statutes empowered the Governor to declare a
county in a state of insurrection whenever in his judgment the civil authorities
are unable to protect its citizens in the enjoyment of life and property. the
Governor, as was declared in- regard to the County Alamance, and the judiciary,
cannot recall his actions in question or review them, as the matter is confided solely to the judgment of the Governor but the writ of habeas corpus
has not been suspended by the Governor, and ought not to be."

The Court then admitted its inability to enforce the writ.
It is submitted that the holding of this case would have harmonized with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the Moyer v. Peabody case, and with the weight -of authority, if it
had held that the return of the Governor to the writ was sufficient,
and that the detention, under the conditions shown to exist was legal.
If the first part of its holding is not sound, it seems that this conclusion would necessarily follow.
In re Commonwealth ex rel Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa., 65
L. R. A., 193.
In this case the court held that a conditioi of qualified martial
law exists where the Governor called out the militia and directed it to
restore order, when rioting and disorder existed by reason of a strike,
and that on such occasions the authority of the civil officers of the
government is subordinate to that of the military, and the military,
while on such duty, .are in active service for the suppression of disorder and violence, and their rights and obligations must be judged
by the standard of actual war, although their acts are subject'.to the
review of civil authorities, which is not the case where actual war
exists, and a military officer charged with the dity of suppressing
a riot cannot be punished by the civil authorities for acts which at the
time seem necessary for the accomplishment of his mission.
The court, in reaching this conclusion, adopted the view held by
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Lord Mansfield and Sir Frederick Pollock, i. e., the justification by
the common law of acts done by necessity for the defense of the
commonwealth; and the court, in the course of its opinion, recognized
the condition as it actually existed, and defined what it means by a
qualified martial law:
"Qualified in that it was to be in force only as to the preservation of public
peace and order, not for the ascertainment or vindication of private rights, or
the other ordinary functions of government. For these the courts and other
agencies of the law are still open, and no exigency required interference with
their functions. But within its necessary field, and for the accomplishment of
its intended purpose, it was martial law, with all its powers. The government
has and must have this power or perish. And it nust be real power, sufficient
and effective for its ends, the enforcement of law, the peace and security of
the community as to life and property.
It is not unfrequently said that the community must be either in a state
of peace or of war, as there is no intermediate state. But from the point
of view now under consideration, this is -an error. There may' be peace for
all the ordinary purposes of life, and yet a state of disorder, violence, and
danger in special directfons, which, though not technically war, has in its
limited field the same effect, and, if important enough to call for martial law
for suppression, is not distinguishable, so far as the powers of the commanding
officer are concerned, from actual war. The condition in fact exists, and
the law must recognize it, no matter how opinions may differ as to what it
should be most correctly called. When the civil authority, though in existence
and operation for some purposes, is yet unable to preserve the public order
and resorts to military aid, this necessarily means the supremacy of actual
force. * * * * But if the situation goes beyond county control, and requires
the full power of the state, the Governor intervenes as the supreme executive,
and he or his military representative becomes the superior and commanding
officer. * * * * The resort to the military arm of the government, therefore,
means that the ordinary civil officers to preserve order are subordinated, and
the rule of force under -military methods is substituted to whatever extent
may be necessary in the discretion of the military commander. To call out
the military, and then have them stand quiet and helpless, while mob law
overrides the civil authorities, would be to make the government contemptible,
and destroy the purpose of its existence.
The effect of martial law, therefore, is to put into operation the powers
and methods vested in the commanding officer by military law. So far as his
powers for the preservation of order and security of life and property are
concerned, there is no limit but the necessities and exigency of the situation.
And in this respect there is no difference between a public war and domestic
insurrection. What has been called the paramount law of self-defense, common to all countries, has established the rule that whatever force is necessary
is also lawful. * * * * * There is no real difference in the commander's
powers in a public war and in domestic insurrection. In both he has whatever
powers may be needed for the accomplishment of the end, but his use of them
is followed by different consequences. In wari he is answerable only to his
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military superiors, but for acts done in domestic territory, even in the suppression of public disorder, he is accountable, after the exigency has passed, to
the laws of the land, both by prosecution in the criminal courts, and by civil
action at the instance of parties aggrieved."
The court then proceeds to discuss the standards by which the
rights and obligations must be judged, holding:
"While the military are in active service for the suppression of disorder
and violence, their rights and obligations as soldiers must be judged by the
standard of actual war. No other standard is possible,"
that the subordinate officer, acting in -obedience to the orders of his
commander, is excused unless the act were manifestly beyond the
scope of his authority, or were such that a man of ordinary sense
and understanding would know that it was illegal, provided he acted
in good faith and without malice. Applying this doctrine to the
case at bar, the prisoner was discharged.
It is submitted that the reasoning of this case squares with the
doctrine of justification under the common law; i. e., the facts being
established, the court found, as a matter of law, that they were
justified on the ground of necessity. A note to this case found in
65 L. R. A., indicated that this decision is not in harmony with the
Ela v. Smith, supra, and the Coit case in Ohio, and states that when
local authorities refrain from doing their duty, it has necessitated a
change in the strict rule of the last mentioned cases, "and compelled
the courts to enlarge the powers of the head of the military when
called out by the civil executive to suppress such rebellion or insurrdction." It might be asked from what source the court gets the
authority to enlarge the powers of.the military.
it re Boyle, Idaho, 45 L. R. A., 833.
The Governor by proclamation set out at length the conditions
that existed in Shoshone County, and had existed for six years past;
that the civil authorities did not appear to be able to control the situation, and declared the County of Shoshone in the State of Idaho to
be in a state of insurrection and rebellion. Afterwards, upon the
call of the Governor, a military force was sent into Shoshone County
by the President of the United States, which proceeded to arrest the
persons believed to have been engaged in the disorders. Among the
persons arrested was the petitioner. The petitioner, in his petition,
based his claim to be discharged from arrest upon the ground that
no insurrection
"That no insurrection now exists in Shoshone County; that the Governor
had no authority to proclaim martial law or suspend the writ of habeas corpus;
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that martial law does not exist in Shoshone County and has not been proclaimed
by anyone having authority to make such proclamation; that the little disturbances of April 29th were over; that the parties implicated in it after having
destroyed about a quarter million dollars of property and committed several
murders, had retired to their homes, and that, in recognition of the inalienable
rights of the citizens'they ought not to be disturbed; that the Governor had no
right or authority to send an agent or representative to Shoshone County to
consult and advise with the military forces sent there by the Federal Government to assist in putting down the insurrection."

The court held that the truth of recitals of alleged facts in the
proclamation issued by the Governor, proclaiming a certain county
in the state to be in a state of rebellion and insurrection, will not be
inquired into or reviewed on application for writ of habeas corpus;
that the said proclamation of the Governor and his action in calling
to his aid the military forces of the United States for the purposes
of restoring good order, and the supremacy of the law, had the effect
to put into force, to a limited extent, martial law in said county, and
such action is not in violation of the constitution, but in harmony
with it, 'being necessary for the preservation of the government, and
in its necessary self-defense, and that in case of insurrection or rebellion the Governor, or the military officer in command, for the purpose of suppressing the same, may suspend the writ of habeas corpus,
or disregard the writ, if issued.
The court, in the course of its opinion, said:
"In such case the government may, like an individual, acting in selfdefense, take those steps necessary to preserve its existence. If hundreds
of men can arm themselves and destroy vast properties, and kill and injure
citizens, thus defeating the ends of government, and the government be unable
to take all needful and necessary steps to restore and maintain order, the
state will then be impotent, if not entirely destroyed, and anarchy placed in
its stead. It is not argument to say that the executive was not applied'to by
any county officer of Shoshone County to proclaim said county to be in a state
of insurrection, and for those reasons the proclamation was without authority.
The recital in the proclamation shows the existence of one of two conditions,
namely, that the county officers in said county, whose duty it was to make
said application, were either in league with the insurrectionists, or else in fear
of the latter said officers refrained from doing their duty. * * * * It having
been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Governor, after some six or seven
years experience, that the execution of the laws in Shoshone County through
the ordinary and established means and methods, was rendered practically
impossible, it became his duty to adopt the means prescribed by the said
statute for establishing in said county the supremacy of the law, * * * * and
it is not the province of the court to hinder, delay or place obstructions in the
path of duty prescribed by la.v for the executive, but rather to render him
all the aid and assistance in their power to bring about the consummation most
devoutly prayed for."
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Prior to the arrest of the petitioner there had been industrial disturbance in San Miguel County, which has assumed such proportions
that the Governor, by proclamation, determined and declared the
county to be in a state of insurrection, and the military officers of
the State of Colorado sent into the county for the purpose of restoring
order, arrested the petitioner, and were detaining him upon the
ground that he was aiding and abetting in insurrection. Upon petition
for a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court of Colorado, the
writ was issued and the return made thereto, and the Court, denying
the writ, held:
"That the recitals in the Governor's proclamation establishing martial law
in a county in the state, that a state of insurrection existed there, cannot be
controverted in a habeas corpus proceeding to secure the release of one arrested,
by the military authorities; that the acts of the Governor in exercising his,
constitutional power to suppress insurrection, cannot be interfered with by the
court so long as he does not exceed the power conferred upon him, and that
the military, in suppressing an insurrection under the Governor's orders, may,
without turning them over to the civil authorities, seize and detain insurrectionists and those aiding and abetting them until the insurrection is suppressed,
and that such seizure and detention of insurrectionists by the militia, when
acting under the orders of the Governor to suppress insurrection, does not
violate the constitutional provision that the military shall always be in strict
subordination to the civil authority, since the act of the Governor is-in his
civil capacity.
The crucial question, then, is simply this: Are the arrests, and detention,
of petitioners narrated illegal? When an express power is conferred, the
necessary means may be implied to exercise it which are not expressly implied
or prohibited. Laws must be given a reasonable construction, which, so long as
possible, will enable' the end thereby sought to be obtained. So with the constitution. It must be given that construction of which it is suscettible, which
will tend to maintain and preserve the government of which it is a foundation,
and protect the citizens of a state in the enjoyment of their inalienable rights.
* * *If, as contended by counsel for petitioner, the military, as soon as
the rioter or insurrectionist is arrested, must turn him over to the civil authorities of the county, the arrest might, and in many instances would, amount
to a mere farce. He would be released on bail and left free to again join the
rioters or engage in aiding and abetting their action, and if again arrested
the same .process would have to be repeated, and thus the action of the
military would be rendered a nullity. * * * To deny the right of the military
to detain them when arrested, while engaged in suppresing acts of violence,
and until order is restored, would lead to the most absurd results."
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Steele deals with the right
to suspeid the writ of habeas corpus, and is rich in excerpts from,
speeches delivered in Congress upon the propriety of the suspension
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of the writ of habeas corpus during President Madison's administration. This case did not suspend the writ of habeas corpus; but, upon
the contrary, the writ was issued and return made thereto, and the
petitioner remanded, the court holding that his detention was legal.
After his release Moyer brought suit in the Federal Court of
Colorado against Governor Peabody, for damages. A demurrer was
interposed to his declaration, and sustained, and the case certified
to the Supreme Court of the United States, who held that the imprisonment of two and a half months under the order of the Governor of
the State, without sufficient reason, but in good faith in the exercise
of the power under the State constitution and laws to call upon the
military arm of the State to suppress insurrection, does not deprive the
person imprisoned of his liberty without due process of law, and in
the course of its opinion said:
"It is admitted, as it must be, that the Governor's declaration that a state
of insurrection existed, is conclusive of that fact. It seems to be admitted also
that the arrest alone would not necessarily have given a right to bring this
suit. But it is' said that a detention for so many days, alleged to be without
probable cause, at a time when the courts were open, without an attempt to
bring the plaintiff before them, makes a case on which he has a right to have
a jury pass. * * * * Of course, the plaintiff's position is that he has been
deprived of his liberty without due process of law. But it is familiar that what
is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject
matter and the necessities of the situation. * * * * In such a situation we must
assume that he had a right, under the state Constitution and laws, to call out
troops, as was upheld by the Supreme Court of the State. "* * * *

That means

that he shall make the ordinary use of the soldiers to that end; that he may
kill persons who resist, and, of course, that he may use the milder measure
of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in the way of
restoring peace. * * * When it comes to a decision by the head of the
state upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must
yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment Public danger warrants
the substitution of executive process for judicial process. * * * * * This was
admitted with regard to killing men in the actual clash of arms; and we think
it obvious, although it was disputed, that the same is true of temporary detention to prevent apprehended harm. As no one would deny that there was
immunity for ordering a company to fire upon a mob in insurrection, and that
a state law authorizing the Governor to deprive citizens of life, under such
circumstances, was consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, we are of the
opinion that the same is true of a law authorizing by implication what was
done in this case. It is unnecessary to consider whether there are other
reasons why the circuit court was right in its conclusion."26
(To be concluded in the next number.)
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